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VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR FRAUD AND DECEIT
IN IOWA
N MATURE legal systems persons are held individually responsible for the harmful results of their acts; indeed, such
a concept seems indispensable in the maintenance of an ordered
society. And likewise when a person directs another to do an act,
and it is done as directed, the person directing the act is held to
the same responsibility as if he had done the act personally; for
whatever the result is in criminal law, the civil law does not distinguish between an act done personally and one which, although
accomplished through the instrumentality of another is accomplished as intended by the one directing it. In such cases, however,
the legal problems involved cause no difficulty to those interested
in the three-party relationship called agency.
The moment, however, the one who has been directed to act,
does an act for which he has not been directed, or does an act in
a manner different from that directed, the question of the responsibility of his principal for these acts becomes more difficult. In
general these acts may be divided into acts imposing contractual
obligations on the principal and those subjecting him to tort
liability. In the first of these classes the act results from the agent
dealing with the third party, in the second class the act is normally independent of such dealings. In either case the principal
may be liable for the act, although he has not directed it or it
has been done contrary to his direction, but the basis of his liability
will largely depend upon the type of act his agent performed.
Each class has its own problems, but when an agent in dealing
with a third party makes deceitful representations of which his
principal had no knowledge the difficulties of both classes are combined. In such cases the act arises out of a contractual dealing
with the third party which is in itself tortious; so that the remedy
is frequently sought in an action of tort rather than in contract.
The situation because it involves both tort and contract necessitates
a consideration of the liability of the principal for each.
In considering this problem two more or less interrelated inquiries must be answered: What are the reasons for imposing
liability on the principal ? and What is the extent of that liability ?
Although it may be as Mechem says, "an obvious natural and
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moral necessity as well as a legal one, founded upon manifest doctrines of good faith and moral and legal responsibility"' that the
principal should be liable for the acts which he directs his agent
to commit, it is equally obvious that such natural law concepts
are unprofitable in explaining why a principal who was both
ignorant and innocent of the deceit of his agent should stand the
responsibility for its consequences.
PRINCIAL's LIABILITY FOR DECEITS HE NEITHER CONTEMPLATED
Noa DECTED
Principals though personally innocent are almost universally
held responsible in an action of deceit for some of the frauds and
deceits of their agents. The reasons for this liability are our first
consideration; the limits of liability -will be considered later.
One explanation of the principal's liability is founded on the
maxim that where one of two innocent parties must suffer he that
has placed the deceiver in a position to do harm must bear the loss. 2
This suggestion appears attractive as a simple explanation of the
principal's liability, but like so many maxims it is more the statement of a result than of the reasons for it. It apparently borrows
much from the tort concept that where one person establishes or
sets in motion a conceivably dangerous instrumentality, he must
accept responsibility for the harm that it occasions although he
himself is personally innocent of any wrongdoing. This requirement of innocence is of significance, however, only in regard to
the one injured, for as applied to the one who "put the deceiver
in a position to do harm" innocence is an unnecessary element in
liability and its use merely emphasizes the extended degree of
liability to which the principal may be subjected. The proposition
might be more accurately stated in this fashion: 'Where a person
has placed a deceiver in a position to do harm he must bear the
loss suffered by innocent third parties who have dealt with the
deceiver. It should be noted, however, that regardless of the manner in which the proposition is stated it offers no reason for the
result which it proposes.
Other cases suggest that the principal is liable because the
'3Mechem, Agency, §704.
2 Hem v. Nichols, 1 Salk 289 (K. B. 1708); Locke v. Stearns, 1 Met. 560.
(Mass. 1840); Lee v. Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 448 (1869); Sanford v. Handy, 23
Wend. 260 (N. Y. 1840).
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3
agent's acts or representations may be imputed to him. This suggestion is of course not helpful; it is merely another way of stating in a fictitious manner that the principal is liable.
Again some courts say that the principal will be liable in the
same manner as if he had made the statement, if the statement
4
As a
was made within the scope of the agent's employment.
it
however,
direct statement this adds nothing: by implication,
is
himself
suggests that the principal is liable either because he
that
or
making a representation that the agent represents his will,
he is liable because the employment included the making of such
statements. The first suggestion is alluring until we discover that
the principal may be liable for his agent's deceits when no representations on his part can be found ;5 and the second is unattractive
for it merely substitutes one undetermined phrase for another"scope of employment" is quite as illusory as the determination
of liability.
Perhaps the reasons for holding the principal responsible for
the deceits of his agent are in final analysis social and economic;
based on the concept that within certain limits the principal should
pay for deceits just as he pays for other business mistakes. In
other words, that it is good policy to require the business which
profits from honest dealings to stand the loss occasioned by its
dishonest transactions. The basis of such a conclusion is a reasonable one, for the business transactions from which this type of
loss result indicate that while the principal may be and often is
entirely innocent of any fraudulent conduct of his agent in a
particular case, he must nevertheless anticipate the possibility of

(the
3 Hopkins v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 57 Iowa 203, 10 N. W. 605 (1881)
agent's acts in regard thereto must be considered as the acts of his principal); Hathaway v. Johnson, 55 N. Y. 93 (1873) ("the fraud of the agent
acting within the scope of his authority is, in law, imputed to his principal");
Merrit v. Huber, 137 Iowa 135, 114 N. W. 627 (1908); Fulton v. Fisher, 151
Iowa 429, 131 N. W. 662 (1920); Campbell v. Park, 128 Iowa 181, 101 N. W.
861 (1904); Hollinsworth v. Holbrook, 80 Iowa 151, 45 N. W. 561 (1890).
4 The Steamboat Northern Illinois, 23 Iowa 109 (1867); Lindmeier v.
Monahan, 64 Iowa 24, 19 N. W. 839 (1884); Hopkins v. Hawkeye Ins. Co.,
supra n. 3; Shuttlefield v. Neil, 163 Iowa 470, 145 N. W. 1 (1914); Weeks v.
Currier, 172 Mass. 53, 51 N. E. 416 (1898); Sharp v. Mayor, 40 Barb. 256
(N. Y. 1863); Trankla v. McLean, 18 Misc. 221, 41 N. Y. Supp. 388 (1896);
Stinpson v. Achorn, 158 Mass 342, 33 N. E. 518 (1893).
5 See Warren A. Seavey, "Rationale of Agency,"

(1920).

29 Yale L. J. 858, 881
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such occurrence. He thus has the choice of doing everything
personally and transacting a small business safely or conducting
his business through others and accepting a degree of responsibility
for their acts. Thus if he employs agents he must realize that
regardless of his care, some of them may be tempted by a natural
and human desire to make sales and commissions, to exceed their
authority, fail to disclose the limitations on their power, or even
in some cases to make false and deceitful representations. The
principal must also apprehend that the acceptance of his agent
in the business world will depend in a large measure on the use
of his name, and that by and large his agent will be dealt with in
reliance on that name.
Further, the principal is the aggressor; with all of the instrumentalities at his disposal he has selected one, and for that one
he should stand responsible, not only because it is he that has set
it in motion, but also because third parties will inevitably accept
that instrumentality as his. And of course where the business is
corporate, it must of necessity act by and through agents, so that
it would seem difficult to contemplate business operation without
including the mistakes, errors and deceits of its agents as one of
the incidents of that type of business.
The complexity of modern business organization, likewise, forecloses any thorough investigation by the third party of the source
of an agent's power or the truth of his representation; indeed, in
the normal transaction the press of other business demands that
the parties deal with each other in reliance on their respective good
faith. And even in the small individual transaction where the
considerations of large scale business are not present, the psychological phenomenon that the normal human being is essentially a
trusting individual who is accustomed to deal honestly with honest
individuals, is a sufficient reason for the law to protect third
parties rather than to impose upon them the duty of exercising
a suspicious inquisitiveness with which nature has not endowed
them. On the other hand, the placing of liability on the principal
does not place this unnatural duty of suspicion upon him; it
rather declares that because he has undertaken to accomplish a
result in the manner of his own selection and for his own individual
profit, it is proper that he who will benefit from honest endeavor
should stand the loss occasioned by deceit. It is believed that
such considerations as these lie behind the reasons which the courts
suggest as the basis of the principal's liability.
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Indeed, most courts have on one theory or another held principals responsible for some of the fraudulent acts and representations of their agents. The third party is universally granted
the right of rescission.6 This, however, frequently fails to return
him to his original position; consequently some courts have allowed
third parties to maintain an action on deceit.7 The purpose has
not been, however, to give him the benefit of his bargain, but only
to grant him the protection that rescission fails to give.
A few states have, nevertheless, refused to give any relief in
deceit to third parties." These states do so on the theory that
liability in deceit arises only from the conscious expression of the
will of the person to be bound. In other words, they refuse to
impose liability without fault. They stigmatize this type of liability as an anomaly in the law. It is not. Many jurisdictions hold
persons for loss occasioned by their animals,9 for damage caused
6 Ellison v. Stockton, 185 Iowa 979, 170 N. W. 435 (1919) ; Rackemann v.
Riverbank Improv. Co., 167 Mass. 1, 44 N. E. 990 (1896); Presby v. Parker,
56 N. H. 409 (1876); Chafee v. Raymond, 241 Mich. 392, 216 N. W. 372
(1928); Miller Estate v. Drury, 120 Wash. 628, 208 Pac. 77 (1922). But see:
Neff v. Varn, 17 Fed (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Piano Co. v. Garza Co.,
53 Tex. Civ. App. 346, 116 S. W. 150 (1909).
7 Riser v. Walton, 78 Calif. 490, 21 Pac. 362 (1889); Day v. Merrick, 158
Iowa 287, 138 N W. 40 (1916); Harris v. Polk Cty Invest. Co., 188 Iowa
1259, 177 N. W. 476 (1920); Rush v. Leavitt, 99 Kan. 498, 162 Pac. 310
(1917); Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 142 N. E. 695 (1890); Moynes v.
Applebaum, 218 Mich. 198, 187 N. W. 241 (1922); Heidegger v. Burg, 137
Minn. 53, 162 N. W. 889 (1917); Sanford v. Handy, svpra n. 2; Jeffrey v.
Bigelow, 13 Wend. 518 (1835); Krum v. Beach, 96 N. Y. 398 (1884); Phillips
v. West Rockaway Land Co., 226 N. Y. 507, 124 N. E. 87 (1919); Ladd v.
Lord, 36 Vt. 194 (1863); Matteson v. Rice, 116 Wis. 328, 92 N. W. 1109
(1903).
sKenneday v. McKay, 43 N. J. L. 288 (1881); State v. Fredericks, 47
N. J. L. 469, 1 Atl. 470 (1885); Keefe v. Sholl, 181 Pa. St. 90, 37 Atl. 116
(1897); Dellwo v. Peterson, 32 Idaho 172, 180 Pac. 167 (1919); see also,
Erisman v. McCarty, 77 Colo. 289, 236 Pac. 777 (1925); Hodson v. Wells &
Dickey Co., 31 N. D. 395, 154 N. W. 193 (1915); Samson v. Beale, 27 Wash.
557, 18 Pac. 180 (1902); Ellison v. Stockton, supra n. 6.
9 While it is not suggested that there is any analogy between the animal
cases and the agency eases, the animal cases, the "Fletcher v. Rylands ewes,I
and employer's liability cases have been included merely to show that liability
of this type is not unusual. Noyes v. Colby, 30 N. H. 143 (1855); Manton v.
Brockelbank, [1923] 2 K. B. 212, 129 L. T. 135; Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La.
Ann. (1881); Dickson v. McCoy, 39 N. Y. 400 (1868).

IOWA LAW .EVIBW

by things kept upon their land,1 ° for the acts of their servants"in short persons are held liable for many torts where there is no
personal fault. A deceit is a tort, and the degree of liability
should be no less than that for other torts, merely because the
deceit may result in a relationship which gives rise to certain contractual obligations in which at least an apparent expression of
the will is required.
The view of the minority, though apparently unsound, has been
accepted by a fairly recent Iowa case, with the result that in certain situations the action of deceit is no longer a protection to deceived third parties who have dealt with defrauding agents, when
they seek recovery against the principals. The case in which this
limitation was suggested was Ellison v. Stockton.'2 The principal
had listed his land with real estate agents for the purpose of securing a purchaser. The agents showed the land to the plaintiff and
made false representations which were alleged to have induced the
sale. At a later date the plaintiff went to the defendant and agreed
to purchase the land. The plaintiff now asks damages for the injury he sustained because of the agent's deceitful representations
that the land would not overflow. The court in reviewing the case
assumed that the representations were not true; that they were
unlmown to and unauthorized by the principal; and that the plaintiff purchased the land in reliance upon them. The court said:
"It

is undoubtedly true that whatever an agent says or does,

10 Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 Hurl. & Colt. 774 (Ct. of Exchequer 1865);
Francis H. Bohlen, "Rule in Rylands and Fletcher," 59 U of Pa. L. Rev. 298
(1911); Ezra Ripley Thayer, "Liability Without Fault," 29 Harv. L. Rev.

801 (1916).
"Ives v. South Buffalo R. R., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911); Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1918); liability may
also be imposed for the acts of independent contractors; Thompson v. Lowell
Ry. Co., 170 Mass. 577, 49 N. E. 913 (1898); Veazie v. Penobscot R. R., 49
Maine 119 (1860).
12 Supra n. 6. The Ellison Case also suggests an attitude expressed in the
much earlier case of Roberts v. Rumley, 58 Iowa 301, 12 N. W. 323 (1882),
in which the court said, " ... to hold that the principal is bound by agreements between the special agent and the person with whom he contracts, not
authorized by the agent's appointment, and of which he had no knowledge
when he accepted the benefits of the contract, would be entirely subversive of
the whole doctrine of special agency, and instead of requiring the person
dealing with the agent to ascertain, at his peril, that the agent has kept within his special authority, would require the principal to inquire, at his peril,
whether the agent had gone beyond it."
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within the scope of his authority, binds his principal, and is deemed
his act. The authority must be either express or implied-expressly given or implied from the relationship created and existing. The scope of the agents' authority was to sell, or procure
a purchaser for the land. Thus far, they bound their principal
by their acts. They could not bind him by untruthful and unauthorized representations touching the character of the thing
which they were authorized to sell. The authority to make these
representations was not necessarily included within the terms of
the agency... When the agent procures a purchaser, ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms proposed, or on terms satisfactory to the seller, he had done all that his contract calls on him
to do; all that his contract authorizes him to do. Representations
made by an agent possessing this limited authority, touching the
character of the
property offered for sale, are not binding upon
' 13
his principal.'
The court suggests that liability in deceit must arise from authorization, that is, from the expression of the principal's will. They
are willing to assume authorization from "the relationship created
and existing" so long as the representation is truthful, but refuse
to extend the fiction where subsequent events have shown the representation to be false and deceitful. Thus "apparent authority"
tends to release principals from liability in case the act was not
"authorized" or would not have been authorized had the principal
foreseen its consequences.
In this case the court argued that the act was not authorized,
either directly or by implication, because the power "to procure
a purchaser" does not include the power to represent the quality
or condition of the thing offered for sale. But it is submitted, that
although the question whether the power of representation is included within the powers of the agent is largely dependent on the
business custom of the community in which the agent operates,
it is difficult to postulate a situation in which the power to make
such representations would not accompany the power to procure
purchasers. Certainly it would be the utopia of which all salesmen dream if purchasers could be found who made no inquiriesasked no questions-required no persuasion. Unfortunately, however, purchasers are not so easily found, or so easily convinced of
the desirability of purchase. Principals must anticipate that their
agents will have to use certain persuasive talents to secure purchasers; and likewise, third parties normally expect that agents
will have the power to show and represent that which they desire
13

Supra n. 6 at 984, 986.
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to sell; indeed, it seems difficult to maintain in the light of actual
practice that an agent appointed to sell land or to procure a purchaser has no power to make representations. In the instant case
it is hard to imagine how the land could be sold without showing
it to prospective buyers. If this could be done, does it not also
seem reasonable that the one showing the land could make representations in answer to inquiries concerning its character? Certainly we should not require the agent to stand mute once he has
taken his prospect to the property he wishes to sell. To say that
if he makes such representations in this instance, and they are
untruthful, they will be considered unauthorized, whereas they
will be valid and authorized if truthful, is only to say that the
court is unwilling to impose liability without fault.
It is suggested in this case, that the principal should not be
liable for the agent's representation because the actual transaction
was consummated directly with the principal. This view is similar
4 where it was said that the printo that of Haskell v. Starbird,2
cipal should not be liable unless the agent "had full authority to
complete the transaction." There is some merit in this position,
for when the third party closes the deal with the principal, he has
ample opportunity to make such investigation as is necessary to
discover the character and validity of the agent's representations.
If such inquiry is made it places the principal in a position where
he must either affirm the fraud and make it directly on his own
responsibility or else warn the third party that the representations
are unauthorized and made entirely on the agent's own responsibility. If the third party fails to inquire it might reasonably
be assumed that the representation was not the inducing cause of
contracting or that the third party was so indifferent to its truth
and accuracy as to prevent recovery upon it at a later date. Desirable as this result may seem, it has not been accepted. Even in
the Haskell Case, the principal completed the transaction and yet
was held for the agent's representation, for the court said that:
"While a principal may not have authorized the particular act,
he has put the agent in his place to make the sale, and must be
responsible for the manner in which he has conducted himself in
doing the business which the principal entrusted to him."15
Thus the result reached in the Ellison Case hardly seems justified
by the legal principles it purports to adopt or by the factual con24 Svpra n. 7.

15 Supra n. 7 at 120.
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ditions upon which it is based. The more familiar rule announced
in John Gund Brewing Co. v. Peterson6 that "Misrepresentations
made in connection with an authorized sale are binding upon the
principal, although the agent who made them was not expressly
authorized to do so" still seems to announce the more desirable
rule, and the attempt to depart from it under the authority of the
"minority cases'" and a distinction between power of sale and
of procuring purchasers seems ill advised.
THE EXTENT OF THE PRiNcIPAL's

Li.AT=

Accepting as a general proposition the principal's liability for
some of the frauds and deceits of his agents, there still remains
the problem of the extent of his liability. The problem is twofold:
For what acts is the principal liable? and What is the amount of
his liability?
In considering this problem some of the materials considered
previously must be reviewed, for the extent of liability should not
of course exceed the reasons for it. Thus it is clear that on the
one side the principal is liable for all acts which he directs his
agent to perform; and on the other he is not liable for acts committed by those who are not agents, or for acts which the third
party knew were not authorized, or for acts or representations
upon which the third party did not rely. The difficult problem
is to determine what acts relied on by the third party but not
directed by the principal will create liability in the principal and
what ones will not.
Courts have generally tried to describe the acts which create
16130 Iowa 301, 304, 106 N. W. 741, 742 (1906). See also: Belau v. Bryan,
89 Iowa 348, 56 N. W. 512 (1893) "If it be true that Welliver was the agent
of the defendant in making the trade and procuring the land for her, she
would be bound by any fraudulent representations he made to the plaintiffs,
whether the defendant authorized him to make the representations or not."
Hollinsworth v. Holbrook, 80 Iowa 151, 45 N. W. 561 (1890)
"It may be
conceded that such alteration was not contemplated by his instruction as agent,
but it was not forbidden, and it operates as a legal fraud upon the plaintiffs.
Cf. Krause v. Meyer, 33 Iowa 566 (1871) "The good faith of plaintiffs is
not questioned. They cannot be held responsible for their agent's acts in the
matter of his false representations. His fraud cannot be considered theirs.
It would be a great hardship and against conscience, to impose upon them the
penalty of a fraud of which they were in fact innocent and knew nothing, and
in no way aided, directed or sanctioned."
17 Supra n. 8.

IOWA LAW REVIEW
liability as acts which are "apparently authorized" by the principal, or as acts committed within the "scope of employment" of
the agent. When courts seek to find apparent authority they of
course do not mean to suggest that the principal intended the
agent to perform the act, but rather that because of the nature
of the agency third parties may reasonably believe the principal
so intended his agent to act. Unfortunately, however, to use
"apparent authority" as the test of the extent of liability is to
use, as already pointed out, an uncertain measure.
The difficulties of terminology inherent in "apparent authority"
might be remedied by recruiting from the master and servant cases
the term "scope of employment." This term, however, without
further definition adds little in explaining the limits of the principal's liability. If the "scope of employment" comprehends
those acts which the principal authorized the agent to do, it means
no more than actual authority and has done nothing to solve the
problem of liability for uncontemplated acts. If "scope of employment" includes all situations in which the third party reasonably believes the agent has authority to make the representation
that he has made, then it is but a test of apparent authority with
the usual complication that the term "reasonably" is left undefined. If "scope of employment" includes only those representations or acts which a diligent principal might know his agent would
make, that is, those representations which are authorized by the
business custom of a particular community, it fails to include
representations, which are not reasonably foreseeable or which go
beyond the particular custom, and yet are the reasonably inducing
influence to those unfamiliar with business practice. This definition of scope of employment would deprive the very individuals
in greatest need of protection from the protection which the law
affords. Scope of employment, then, means no more than its definition. To generalize from the common use of "scope of employment" we can say little more than that it is the phrase used when
courts wish to impose liability upon principals for the fraud and
deceit of their agents.'
is For cases in which no liability was imposed because the act was not within
the scope of employment see: Balkema v. Searle, 116 Iowa 374, 89 N. W.
1087 (1902); Boddy v. Henry, 113 Iowa 462, 85 N. W. 771 (1901); Lamm v.
Port Defense Homestead Ass'n, 49 Md. 233 (1878); Stimpson v. Aehorn, 158
Mass. 342, 33 N. E. 518 (1893); Brauchman v. Leighton, 60 Mo. App. 38
(1894). But in Moore v. Abbey, 213 App. Div. 787, 210 N. Y. Supp. 766 (1925),
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What then is the limit of liability? "Apparent authority" and
"scope of employment" have proved to be no more than descriptive of a condition and no guide to its determination. Behind these
symbols of liability are social and economic beliefs that business
which profits by honest transactions should bear the loss of the
dishonest. The extent of the application of this doctrine can be
more easily defined by reason than by rule. Thus the reason for
protecting the third party continues only so long as he deals honestly with the agent and in innocence of the fraud committed upon
him, and completes the transaction relying upon false or fraudulent
representation of the agent. To limit the extent of liability by
such a test is more desirable than limiting it by such abstract concepts as "apparent authority" or "scope of employment." The
test does not leave the principal unprotected. Liability depends
on the honesty and reasonableness of the third party's reliance and
that is determinable by the customary business practice of the
community, postulated against the intelligence, business experience,
and care of the third party. This should afford either judge or
jury a satisfactory background upon which to consider the third
party's credibility when he testifies to his belief that the representation he relied upon was the inducing motive for contracting.
The test "honest reliance" is perhaps so simple as to discourage
those who look for legal doctrine dressed in fine cloth, but it serves
the end of limiting liability by a means which is easily ascertainable and which makes the extent of liability co-existent with the
reasons for it. It may be objected that this is no limit on the principal's liability. It is quite the contrary. It will be, for example,
the court suggested that if the representation of the agent was the inducing
cause of the contract it was not material that the representation was beyond
the scope of the agent's authority. In that case the agent represented to the
prospective purchaser of the principal's land that he, the agent, would personally finance the building of a bungalow upon the land The agent entered
into a contract to this effect, and the principal knew of the agreement. The
court, however, said that this was "immaterial" and allowed rescission because, "The statement and agreement of Nett (the agent) was intended to,
and did, influence the plaintiffs to enter into the contract." Here the representation of the agent was beyond the scope of his employment and no attempt
was made to conceal that fact. Unquestionably this collateral contract was an
inducement for the formation of the contract of purchase, but unless it was
made collusively with the principal, the purchaser's only right of action should
be against the agent, for the law cannot give relief from every inducing element in the formation of a contract which in the subsequent course of events

turns out to be unwise.
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difficult for the average business man to convince a court that he
has reasonably relied upon an agent's representation when the
representation is not customary to the business usage of the community. On the other hand, liability might very justly be imposed
upon the principal where the third party was a woman untutored
in business affairs. The rule of reason does not seek to protect
ignorance, but rather to give equal protection to all, not regardless of, but dependent on, their business acumen.
Considerations such as these must of course lie behind the more
legalistic phrases in which liability is expressed. Thus earlier Iowa
decisions have imposed liability in many situations where third
parties have been defrauded by dishonest agents. 19 Even in land
cases closely analogous to the Ellison Case innocent third parties
have been allowed an action in deceit. Thus an agent for the sale
of land may make representations concerning the perfection of
its title and incumbrances upon it, although he cannot waive title
to it.2o Further an agent appointed to show land to prospective
purchasers binds the principal if he shows the customer the wrong
10 James v. Grill, 186 Iowa 1300, 173 N. W. 897 (1919) (representation inducing the sale of paint); Good Roads Mach. Co. v. Ott, 186 Iowa 908, 171
N. W. 721 (1919) (representations inducing the signing of contract of purchase of road graders); Houge v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 174 Iowa
607, 156 N. W. 862 (1916) (representations inducing the purchase of insurance); Pictorial Review Co. v. litz Gibbon & Son, 163 Iowa 644, 145 N. W.
315 (1914) (representation that goods could be returned if not sold); ShoresMueller Co. v. Knox, 160 Iowa 340, 141 N. W. 948 (1913) (representation that
instrument was only a recommendation when it was in fact a guaranty); Providence Jewelry Co. v. Fessler, 145 Iowa 74, 123 NT. W. 957 (1909) (representation that contract was one of bailment and not of sale); John Gund Brewing Co. v. Peterson, 130 Iowa 301, 106 N. W. 741 (1906) (representation concerning encumbrance on saloon); Bonewell v. Jacobson, 130 Iowa 170, 106
N. W. 614 (1906) (representation that vendors would care for fruit trees sold
as "Iadvertising orchard") ; Higbee v. Trumbauer, 112 Iowa 74, 83 N. W. 812
(1900) (representation concerning stock food); McCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co. v. Williams, 99 Iowa 601, 68 N. W. 907 (1896) (representation that machine had all brass bearings); Sawin v. Savings Ass'n, 95 Iowa 477, 64 N. W.
401 (1895) (representation concerning character of stock purchased); Lindmeier v. Monahan, 64 Iowa 24, 19 N. W. 839 (1884) (representation as to
value of business and stock of goods); Hornish v. Peck, 53 Iowa 157, 1 N. W.
641 (1880) (representation inducing the purchase of stock in railway construction company).
20 John Gund Brewing Co. v. Peterson, supra n.19; Iowa R. R.Land Co. v.
Fehring, 126 Iowa 1, 101 N. W. 120 (1904).
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land and represents it as the land his principal wishes to sell.2"
Likewise an agent for the sale of land binds his principal by representations concerning the acreage of the land.22 But since the
Ellison Case, representations concerning the character of the land
to be sold, if the agency is merely for the securing of purchasers,
are not binding upon the principal.23 The singularity of this result
is emphasized by a later case concerning the same facts, in which
the opposite result was reached because the principal was a corporation. 24 Thus in Iowa an act done by the agent of an individual
may create no liability in his principal, but if the principal be
21

Shuttlefield v. Neil, s&upra n.4; Weise v. Grove, 123 Iowa 585, 99 N. W.

191 (1904).
22 Day v. Merrick, 158 Iowa 287, 138 N. W. 400 (1916); Gray v. Sanborn,
178 Iowa 456, 159 N. W. 1004 (1916). For other cases involving fraudulent
representations concerning land see: Harris v. Polk Cty. Inv. Co., upra n. 7
(representation that land never overflowed); Edwards v. Foley, 187 Iowa 5,
173 N. W. 914 (1919) (representation concerning character and value of land
and situation of wells); Fulton v. Fisher, supra n. 3 (representation that other
purchasers were ready to buy at $70 per acre); Belau v. Bryan, supra n. 16
(representation concerning character of land); Gate City Land Co. v. Heilman,
80 Iowa 478, 45 N. W. 760 (1890) (representation that land was well located,
that a cable car line was being extended to the land, and that railway shops
would be erected within a half mile); Heitman v. Clancy, 167 Iowa 58, 148 N.
IV. 1011 (1914) (representation that land to be exchanged was already sold,
so that defendant would not have to take it); Crittenden v. Armour, Barbee
& Co., 80 Iowa 221, 45 N. W. 888 (1890) (representation concerning and inducing sale of land); Butler v. Barley, 67 Iowa 491, 25 N. W. 747 (1885)
(fraud in the sale of land).
23 Svpr n. 6 at 984, 170 N. W. at 437.
24 Harris v. Polk Cty. Inv. Co., supra n. 7, at 1261, 177 N. W. at 476. In
this case the defendant was a corporation, one of whose agents made the representation, and another completed the transaction with the knowledge of the
representation made by the first. The court said, "We may assume, without
deciding, that these representations were not within the scope of the authority
of Newton (the agent) to make, and we may assume, without deciding, that,
if the defendant knew nothing of these representations, was not a party to
the fraud and deceit practiced by Newton, it is not bound by the fraud. Such
assumption, it is claimed, is in line with the holding in Ellison v. Stockton,
...and would follow though Newton was employed by the defendant to find
a purchaser... But the record shows that the defendant is a corporation...
All that it does, all that it says, all that it thinks, mast be done through representatives; and it concedes that Frost (another agent) was its representative in the transaction... We think there was no ground for holding on the
part of the court that the representations charged to have been made, shown to
be false, and material to the trade, were not made by the defendant itself."

IOWA LAW BEYIEW

corporate the same act creates liability. Liability should not be
dependent on such niceties of personality or upon the vagaries of
corporate or physical existence.

THE PRiNcinAL's PowER To LiMIT LiBnimr
If the third party's right to recover against the principal depends on the reasonableness of his reliance on the agent's representations, it would seem that the principal could limit his liability
by giving notice to the third party of the limited character of his
agent's authority. Principals to protect themselves from their
agent's fraud have incorporated into the written contract which
their agents tender, a statement that no representations other
than those contained in the contract have been made,25 or a statement that the agent executing the contract is without authority
to make any representations other than those contained in the
written form,2 6 or the contract may include both such provisions.
The purpose of such provisions is twofold: to protect the principal
from claims that the agent prevented the contract from being read,
or claims that the contract was induced by false or deceitful representations of the agent; and secondly, to protect the principal
against warranties read into the contract by oral agreements of
the agent. The courts, while recognizing these provisions as useful and efficacious in accomplishing the second purpose, 27 and
within the contractual power of the principal as regards the first,
refuse to enforce such agreements when they shield a principal
25 A common form of expressing this limitation is: "The above stipulations
comprise the entire contract between the parties, which has been read over by
the purchaser before signing, and it is expressly agreed that no terms or condition different therefrom or supplemental thereto shall be binding upon either
party, and that all of the statements and representations not herein expressed

in writing shall be absolutely inoperative to effect the right of either party
hereto."

Universal Fashion Co. v. Skinner, 64 Hun 293, 19 N. Y. Supp. 62

(1892).
20 Bonewell v. Jacobson, supra n. 19, is representative of the second form:
"It is also expressly understood that no agent nor any person or persons
representing any party hereto have any right or authority to make any
representation in any wise or manner to change or modify this agreement."
27 But see, Peterson v. Reaping Mach. Co., 97 Iowa 148, 66 N. W. 96 (1896)
... the contract provides 'no one has any authority to add to, abridge, or
change this warranty in any manner' ..

. [this prohibition] .

.

. which pro-

hibits action in any event by the 'corporation is unreasonable...
Such an
agreement is not binding,. and any competent agent could bind the parties by
waiving the provisions of the warranty."
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from the fraud which induced the contract.
Bonewell Case,

As was said in the

"It is perhaps true that by a stipulation in a written contract
collateral agreements or warranties attempted to be made by the
agent may be prevented from becoming portions of the contract
between the parties, but no such stipulation can, as we understand
it, prevent the interposition of the defense of fraud which has
induced the making of the contract.''"
This result may appear unduly severe when applied to a principal who is attempting to protect himself from unauthorized and
fraudulent representations of his agents. This is particularly true
when it is considered that the contract bears notice of the agent's
limited authority, for it would seem that if a third person relied
upon the representations of the agent, he did so entirely upon
the responsibility of the agent. But unfortunately the use of such
provisions is as effective in shielding principals who, if they have
no actual knowledge, have good reason to believe that their agents
will be deceitful, as it is in shielding honest principals engaged
in legitimate business. Indeed, the Iowa court has suggested that
"such unusual precaution in drawing a contract may sometimes
justify suspicion of the good faith of the party preparing it." 29
If the representations of the agent prevent the third party from
reading the contract so that he cannot acquaint himself with the
terms of its provisions then of course the principal should be afforded no rights thereunder. Further the Iowa court has also
been unwilling to allow a principal to plead the negligence of the
28

Suprt&3L 19 at 172, 106 N.W. at 615.

29 Pictorial Review Co. v. Fitz Gibbon & Son, supra n.19. The practical
difficulty of ferreting out the fraudulent from the innocent limitation has lead
most courts and Iowa among them to hold that the inclusion of such re-

strictions will be no defense to an action brought against the principal by defrauded third parties. Providence Jewelry Co. v. Fessler, supra n. 19; Bonewell v. Jacobson, supra n.19; Good Roads Mach Co. v. Ott, supra n.19; Houge
v. St. Paul Fire and Mar. Ins. Co., supra . 19; McCormick Harvesting Mach.
Co. v. Williams, supra n. 19; Smith v. Hildebrand, 15 Misc. 129, 36 N. Y.
Supp. 485 (1895); Universal Fashion Co. v. Skinner, supra n. 25; Roseberry
v. Hart-Parr Co., 145 Minn. 142, 176 N. W. 175 (1915) ; Bent v. Furnald, 188
Ill. App. 552 (1911) ; Mooney v. Cyriacks, 185 Calif. 70, 195 Pac. 922 (1921).
A few states refuse to admit evidence of fraud and enforce the written stipulations strictly. Colonial Dev. Co. v. Bragdon, 219 Mass. 170, 106 N. E. 633
(1914) ; Eastern Adv. Co. v. Patch Co., 235 Mass. 580, 127 N. E.516 (1920)
Equitable MJfg. Co. v. Biggers, 121 Ga.381, 49 S.E. 271 (1904).
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third party in defense to the agent's fraud. In Providence Jewelry
Go. v. Fessler, they said,
"It is urged, however, that defendants were at least negligent
in signing the writing prepared by Waggoner and therefore cannot be heard to deny its obligation. As between the perpetrator
of a fraud or his principal who seeks to profit by it ... and the
defending party.., the rule here contended for is one which does
not appeal to an enlightened sense of justice ... we are not disposed to enlarge the scope of a rule which permits a party to say,
'I admit that the contract sued upon was procured by my fraud and
misrepresentation or by trick or fraud of my agent, nevertheless
you were too easy a mark; you should not have believed me; you
should have been on guard for the trap I set for your feet; and
therefore the law will effectuate my fraud by enforcing against
you a contract to which your mind never gave its assent.' "30
If the third party reads the contract and either overlooks the
limitation provision or else relies on a further representation by
the agent that notwithstanding such provision he still can make
certain representations not included in the written contract, then
the reasonableness of the third party's reliance, as tested by his
business experience, and the nature of the representations made,
should determine whether or not the principal should still be responsible for the representation in spite of the warning given by
the principal. For if the third party understood the character of
such limitations or had conducted himself in so careless a manner
as to be indifferent to the terms of the contract, the principal
should not be responsible for the fraudulent representations of
his agent.
THE KINDS AND AmOUNT OF THE PRiNcIPAL's LBmrTry

Third parties have been universally allowed to rescind their
contracts and exchange that which they have received for that
which they have given.3 1 Recovery in an action of deceit has been
afforded at least to the same degree as recovery on contract for
breach of warranty. In case, however, it is sought to hold the
principal to a greater degree, the doctrine of the retention of
benefits is usually invoked rather than imposing the liability by
an action of deceit. 2 This type of recovery, which is of course
30 Supra n. 19 at 80, 123 N. W. at 959.
33 Spra n. 6.
32 The retention-of-benefits doctrine has been used in Iowa to enforce liability against a principal for both the fraudulent and the unauthorized acts
of his agents. Eadie, Guilford & Co. v. Ashbaugh, 44 Iowa 519 (1876), the
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on the theory of unjust enrichment, has not been logically used,
for liability has been imposed in cases where the principal has had
no opportunity to rescind after discovery of the fraud, and in
cases where his liability was greater than the benefit he retained.
Apparently many courts have used this more painless method of
imposing liability to reach the same results that they believed
would be accomplished by an action in deceit. This attitude was
expressed by Weaver, J. concurring specially, in Ellison v. Stockton, when he said,
"... . it is wholly immaterial whether defendants are chargeable
for damages 'as for deceit', or because they have ratified the fraud
of their agents by approving the sale they have negotiated, or because he cannot be permitted to retain the fruits of the fraud practiced by them, and at the same time deny his liability for the injury so perpetrated upon the plaintiff." 33
While it may be true that in a great many cases the result will
leading Iowa case, unfortunately speaks with much confusion concerning the
necessity of retaining the benefits with knowledge. Consequently some of the
cases indicate that knowledge is necessary. Higbee v. Trumbauer, upra n. 19;
National Improv. & Const. Co. v. Maiken, 103 Iowa 118, 72 N. W. 431 (1897);
dissenting opinion Eadie, Guilford & Co. v. Ashbaugh, supra. Some cases have
required knowledge but imputed the agent's knowledge to the principal unless
the agent also sought to defraud the principal. Russ v. Hansen, 119 Iowa 375,
93 N. IV. 502 (1903); Campbell v. Park, supra n. 3; Harris v. Polk Cty. Inv.
Co., supra n. 7. Some cases apparently required no knowledge. St. Louis Refrigerator Co. v. Vinton Wash. Mach. Co., 79 Iowa 239, 44 N. W. 370 (1890);
Hollinsworth v. Holbrook, supra n. 3; Mankin v. fankin, 91 Iowa 406, 59 N.
W. 292 (1894); Moyers v. Fogerty, 140 Iowa 701, 119 N. W. 159 (1908). See
also Bennet v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238 (1860); Elwell v. Chamberlain, 31 N. Y.
611 (1864). Much the same problem is raised where the principal sues upon
a contract or note obtained by fraud. But in case of loans procured by agents
where the agents have demanded a bonus which if imputable to the principal
would make the contract usurious, the early Iowa cases, following New York
decisions, allowed the principal to avoid the unauthorized act and recover on
the note. Gokey v. Knapp, 44 Iowa 32 (1876); Brigham v. Meyers, 51 Iowa
397, 1 N. W. 61 (1879); Greenfield v. Monaghan, 85 Iowa 211, 52 N. W. 193
(1892); Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219 (1860); Bell v. Day, 32 N. Y. 165
(1865). The later cases have tended to hold the principal to a greater degree
of responsibility by looking behind the external form of the agreements.
France v. Munro, 138 Iowa 1, 11, 115 N. W. 577, 580 (1908) " The workmanship of the plan employed is entirely too elaborate and artistic to be the
natural accompaniment of an ordinary business transaction, in which there is
nothing to conceal." See also, MeNelly v. Ford, 103 Iowa 508, 72 N. W. 672
(1897).
3 Supran. 6 at 995.
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be the same whether suit is for retained benefits or for deceit, there
are nevertheless, certain important cases in which the amount and
the character of the recovery depends entirely upon the action
under which it is recovered. For example, if recovery in deceit
is allowed the defrauded party, he may keep the land and sue for
the difference between the value of the land as represented and
its value as it actually existed, while if recovery can only be had
in rescission he must surrender the land and take back his consideration, and if recovery is for retained benefits, he must theoretically at least, be subject to the possibility that the principal
will tender a return of the consideration. Further the amount of
recovery may be much greater in deceit than in rescission or for
retained benefits. While there are apparently no Iowa cases illustrative of this problem, several cases from other jurisdictions furnish striking examples of the difference in the amount of recovery
that results from an action in deceit and an action for retained
benefits.
In Jeffrey v. Bigelow,"4 the agent of the principal sold sheep to
the plaintiff without informing him that the sheep were infected
with disease. The sheep were mixed with those of the plaintiff
and as a result of the disease all of the sheep died. The principal
did not know of the condition of the sheep or that his agent had
made false representations concerning them. The agent knew that
the sheep were infected. The principal was held responsible for
all of the damages which "necessarily and naturally flow" from
the act of his agent, and so was held to recompense the third party
not only for the sheep which he had purchased but also for the
loss sustained to his own flock.
Again, where an agent for the collection of rent and the care of
the principal's property represented to a tenant that the ceiling
in the tenement had been examined and found safe, the principal
was held responsible for the damages resulting from the personal
35
injuries to the tenant occasioned by the falling of the ceiling.
34 13 Wend. 518 (N. Y. 1835). See also, Lutz v. Forbes, 13 La. Ann. 609
(1859) in which case the principal was held for the loss of six horses owned
by the plaintiff the loss resulting from a disease communicated by a horse purchased from the defendant's agent and represented by him to be sound. And
also, see Gibson v. Colt, 7 Johns. 390 (N. Y. 1811).
-OWilliams v. Goldberg, 58 Mise, 210, 109 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1908).
The
later case of Renard v. Grenthal, 81 Mise. 135, 142 N. Y. Supp. 328 (1913),
though apparently reaching an opposite result, is distinguishable on the
ground that the representation was substantially true, and the agent's remark
that "there was no danger" was mere statement of opinion.

VIABIOUS LIABILITY IN IOWA

The court said, that as the plaintiff's injuries, though "not the
immediate results of the defendant's agent's deceit ... were...
the indirect result of the deceit, a natural and probable effect of
the agent's wrongful act ... the representations having been made
in the scope of the agent's authority the principal is responsible."
It should be noted that in this case unless the recovery was allowed in deceit the injured party would be without means of recompensing his injuries.
Cases such as these show that it is of considerable importance
to determine vhether recovery should be for deceit or whether it
should be for profits of the fraud which the principal retains, or
whether it should be rescission only, and in lieu of rescission a
money judgment. In the cases outlined above an action of deceit
is the only means by which the injured party can be adequately
protected.
To allow recovery on the retention-of-benefits theory in those
cases where recovery for deceit is also permissible, though not
wrong, seems undesirable for it is more logical that the principal
be held responsible on the basis of the act or representation of
his agent, rather than on the basis that he is withholding that
which it is inequitable for him to retain, for if it is inequitable
it is because of the agent's representation. The liability arises
from the agency relationship and the fact that the principal retains the profits of such relationship creates no additional legal
obligations on his part.
CONCLUSION
In general, the Iowa court imposes liability in deceit upon a
principal for some of the acts of his agent, even though he has
neither contemplated nor directed them to be done. This liability
normally extends to all acts which arise from the nature of the
agent's employment and which have been reasonably relied upon
by the third party. The case of Ellison v. Stockton sought to limit
this liability in case the agent was appointed only for the purpose
of procuring a purchaser and the power of completing the transaction was reserved to the principal. It is submitted that it is
undesirable to deny an action of deceit in these cases for it reverts to doctrines of no liability without fault and ignores the
practice of modern business.
To allow principals to contract with third parties limiting their
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liability has been wisely limited so that such contracts cannot be
urged as a basis for preventing evidence of fraud in the inducing
of the contract. That such a rule is a hardship on some principals
does not overshadow its benefits-apparently principals must accept such liability as an incident of doing business.
Finally it is urged that the action of deceit be used where it is
applicable, rather than attempting to reach a similar result by
the only partially satisfactory remedy for retained benefits. The
action for the retention of benefits should not be used where liability arises from the deceitful action of the principal's agent. In
other words, it is urged that the doctrine of the Ellison Case be
abandoned as out of line with the majority of jurisdictions, and
more fundamentally because it fails to reach its results by valid
legal reasoning.
FRANK E. HoAcx, Ja.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

